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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with one count of felony domestic battery, one count of attempted
strangulation, one count of felony kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault, Michanglo
Smith exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. He was found guilty of felony domestic
battery, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor false imprisonment, but the jury was unable to
reach a decision on the attempted strangulation charge. Mr. Smith was re-tried on the attempted
strangulation charge and the jury found him guilty.
On appeal, Mr. Smith contends that in his first trial, the district court erred by admitting
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence of a prior incident between Mr. Smith and a State's
witness, by denying his motion for a mistrial, by allowing the State to re-open its case-in-chief to
establish an element of the charged offenses; and by admitting irrelevant evidence that Mr. Smith
was sexually propositioned.
Mr. Smith also asserts that the district court abused its discretion during the second trial
by allowing one fact witness to provide a medical opinion which was undisclosed to the defense.
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgments of conviction and
remand his case for a new trial. Mr. Smith also contends that the district court erred by ordering
$363 in restitution for lost wages.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On the evening of January 27, 2018, Mr. Smith and his girlfriend, Seanette Cole, became
involved in a physical disagreement after Ms. Cole returned home from work. (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.205, L.2 - p.208, L.1; p.703, Ls.15-20; p.705, Ls.4-19.) Ms. Cole sustained injuries that night
that she attributed to Mr. Smith. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.207, L.20 -p.227, L.24; p.394, Ls.9-24.)
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Ms. Cole sought medical treatment around noon the next day. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.367,
Ls.7-14.) She told law enforcement and medical care providers that Mr. Smith had choked her at
their apartment, punched her in his truck, and then punched and choked her at a nearby city park.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.296, Ls.9-15; p.381, L.14 - p.382, L.16; p.394, L.22 - p.395, L.20.)
Ms. Cole's left eye was very swollen and she had blood on her lip. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.394,
Ls.14-24; p.501, Ls.13-24; p.702, L.18 -p.703, L.14; State's Exhibits 4, 5.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Smith with one count of
felony domestic battery, one count of attempted strangulation, one count of felony first-degree
kidnapping and one count of felony aggravated assault. (R., pp.33-34, pp.38-39.)
Mr. Smith exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. At trial, Ms. Cole told the jury
that she and Mr. Smith traveled to her place of employment because he was concerned about the
meaning of a text message she had received from her boss, Barry Apker. (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
p.203, L.21 - p.212, L.10; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.245, L.19 - p.246, L.12.) Ms. Cole testified that
Mr. Smith took her phone and was texting with Mr. Apker. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.210, Ls.15-18;
Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.246, L.1 - 247, L.17.) Ms. Cole testified that they then traveled to a park
where he struck her and choked her. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 217, L.5 - p.220, L.7.) Ms. Cole
testified that she did not remember everything that occurred because she was in and out of
consciousness that night. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.208, Ls.18-24; p.220, Ls.2-9; p.222, Ls. I-7; p.223,
Ls.13-20; p.225, Ls.15-21; p.240, Ls.17-22; p.251, Ls.7-13; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.241, L.6 -p.242,
L.18.)

Ms. Cole testified that she did not recall what she told the medical care providers, law

enforcement, or the folks at the FACES of Hope Victim Advocate Center the next day. (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.247, L.2 - p.263, L.3.)

2

During the first trial, the prosecutor asked Mr. Apker several questions regarding the text
message referring to a prior contact between Mr. Apker and Mr. Smith.

Although defense

counsel twice asserted a relevance objection to the prosecutor's line of questioning (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.428, L.2 - p.429, L.10), Mr. Apker continued to respond to the prosecutor's
questions, and he told the jury that Mr. Smith and Ms. Cole were having problems some months
before (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.429, L.2 - p.430, L.5). Mr. Smith called the restaurant multiple times
after which he came in and "apologized for harassing, calling the store, trying to get ahold of her,
and bothering the place of business." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 428, L.2 - p.430, L.5.) Thereafter,
defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was denied. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.431, Ls.15-25;
p.440, Ls.3-9.)
At the first trial, Mr. Smith testified that Ms. Cole came home injured-with her eye
swollen shut and blood on her face. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.703, Ls.7-14.) He testified that she
became agitated and hit her face on Mr. Smith's truck. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.705, Ls.4-19.)
After the defense rested, the State called Detective Wigington as a rebuttal witness (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.761, Ls.15-21), but then moved to reopen its case-in-chief after the defense
requested that the jury instructions include the definition of "cohabitating" (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.762, L.4 - 773, L.22). The district court granted the State's motion, and Detective Wigington
testified regarding his knowledge of the intimacy of Mr. Smith and Ms. Cole's relationship.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.762, L.4 - 773, L.22.) Included in his testimony was a story relayed to him
by Mr. Smith in which Mr. Smith described an incident where a female stranger at a bar
propositioned he and Ms. Cole about a three-way sexual encounter. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 838,
Ls.14-17.) This evidence was admitted over defense counsel's objections. (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.838, Ls.18-19.) The jury found Mr. Smith guilty of felony domestic battery, misdemeanor
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assault, and misdemeanor false imprisonment. (R., pp.186, 188-89.) The jury could not reach a
decision on the attempted strangulation charge. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.962, Ls.2-4; R., p.187 .)
Mr. Smith was re-tried six months later on the attempted strangulation charge. During
the second trial, the prosecutor focused on eliciting opinion testimony from Ms. Cole's treatment
providers regarding whether darker skin such as Ms. Cole's might not show bruising, in order to
prove an attempted strangulation occurred absent marks to Ms. Cole's neck. (Trial Tr. Vol. III,
p.28, L.11 - p.77 L.12.) The jury found him guilty. (Trial Tr. Vol. IV, p.80, L.25 - p.81, L.4;
R., p.278.)
At Mr. Smith's sentencing hearing for all convictions, the State recommended a sentence
of ten years fixed, for the domestic violence conviction, and credit for time served on the
misdemeanors. (4/24/19 Tr., p.61, L.22 - p.62, L.1.) The State recommended ten years, with
five years fixed, for the attempted strangulation conviction, to be served consecutively to the
sentence for domestic violence.

(4/24/19 Tr., p.62, Ls.2-4.)

Mr. Smith's counsel called a

forensic psychologist who testified that Mr. Smith had much lower than average levels of anger
and aggression. (4/24/19 Tr., p.27, L.5 - p.30, L.24.) Mr. Smith's counsel asked the court to
sentence Mr. Smith to ten years, with three years fixed, for both the domestic battery conviction
and the attempted strangulation conviction, credit for time served on the misdemeanors, and to
retain jurisdiction over Mr. Smith on both felony convictions. (4/24/19 Tr., p.71, L.13 - p.74,
L.21.) The district court sentenced Mr. Smith to ten years, with seven years fixed, on the felony
domestic battery conviction. 1

(4/24/19 Tr., p.88, Ls.6-1 0; p.91, L.20 -

p.92, L.9;

R., p.311.) Mr. Smith was sentenced to credit for time served on the misdemeanor convictions.

1

Different district court judges presided over the first and second trials. (4/24/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.812.) Each judge sentenced Mr. Smith for the conviction(s) sustained at the conclusion of the trial
they presided over. (4/24/19 Tr., p.6, Ls.13-17.)
4

(4/24/19 Tr., p.91, L.20 - p.92, L.2; R., pp.311-12.) The district court sentenced Mr. Smith to
fifteen years, with eight years fixed, on the attempted strangulation. (4/24/19 Tr., p.100, L.10 p.101, L.3; R., p.317.) The sentences on the two felony convictions were ordered to be served
consecutively. (4/24/19 Tr., p.100, Ls.20-23; R., p.317.) Mr. Smith's aggregated sentence was
twenty-five years, with fifteen years fixed.
Mr. Smith filed Notices of Appeal timely from his judgments of conviction. (R., pp.33141, 355-59.) After a contested restitution hearing, Mr. Smith was ordered to pay restitution in
the amount of $5,846.12. (R., pp.352-53.) Mr. Smith filed a second Notice of Appeal timely
from the restitution order. (R., pp.355-57.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by admitting irrelevant and overly prejudicial evidence of a prior
encounter between Mr. Smith and a State's witness?

II.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Smith's motion for a mistrial?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of a State's witness
on the effect of bruising on darker skin where the State did not comply with expert
disclosure requirements?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to reopen its case-in-chief?

V.

Did the district court err by admitting irrelevant testimony recounting an incident in
which a stranger sexually propositioned Mr. Smith?

VI.

Did the district court err by ordering $363 in restitution for Ms. Cole's lost wages?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Irrelevant And Overly Prejudicial Evidence Of A Prior
Encounter Between Mr. Smith And A State's Witness

A.

Introduction
Mr. Smith asserts that district court erred by admitting irrelevant and overly prejudicial

evidence that, some months prior to the incident at issue, Mr. Smith had repeatedly called
Ms. Cole's place of employment to speak to her, and had then come into the business and
apologized to Ms. Cole's supervisor, Barry Apker, for his harassing behavior, "bothering the
place ofbusiness." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.429, L.25 - p.430, L.2.)

B.

Standard Of Review
The relevancy of evidence is reviewed de nova.

State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 202

(2006) (citing State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632 (1997)). The district court's determination
of whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. This Court must examine whether the trial court: (1)
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

C.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Irrelevant And Overly Prejudicial Evidence Of A
Prior Encounter Between Mr. Smith And A State's Witness
After the prosecutor asked Mr. Apker several questions regarding the portion of their text

exchange referring to an incident occurring several months prior whereby Mr. Smith came into
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Ms. Cole's place of work, defense counsel twice asserted a relevance objection to the
prosecutor's line of questioning.

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.416, Ls.3-7; p.428, L.2 - p.429, L.10.)

Mr. Apker continued to respond to the prosecutor's questions, and he told the jury that Mr. Smith
and Ms. Cole were having problems, and Mr. Smith called the restaurant multiple times after
which he came in and "apologized for harassing, calling the store, trying to get ahold of her, and
bothering the place of business." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 428, L.2 - p.430, L.5.) Thereafter, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting that the evidence was irrelevant and was more prejudicial
than probative under I.R.E. 403. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.431, L.15 -p.434, L.5.)
Mr. Smith argued that the prior conduct was not relevant to the events that occurred on
January 27-28, 2018, and that it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial, because the jury had heard
that there was a prior incident past harassment or harassing conduct before the incident of
alleged domestic violence.

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.432, Ls.1-15.)

The prosecutor argued that

testimony regarding Mr. Smith's prior harassing conduct and subsequent visit to the store put
into context the text message exchange admitted as State's Exhibits 30A through 30L. (Trial
Tr. Vol. I, p.418, L.13-p.419, L.19; p.432, L.21-p.433, L.17.)
In ruling on the mistrial motion, the district court analyzed the challenged testimony
pursuant to I.R.E. 401,403, and 404(b). (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.434, L2-p.437, L.17.)
Essentially, the defense is requesting a mistrial under 401 and 403 because the
basis stated was irrelevant, and even if it is relevant, it's unduly prejudicial. The
defense did not cite 404(b) as a basis, but I think that this evidence also goes into
the realm of 404(b).
It is important to note in all of the motions in limine, in all of the Court's pretrial
orders, none of them actually addressed Mr. Apker's testimony. And so his
testimony is not the basis of the Court's rulings in its orders in limine.
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So the question is, is the testimony about this prior incident relevant? Relevancy,
under 401 makes it whether any question of fact has a tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
The evidence that is in the record at this point from Ms. Cole is that on the
evening of the 27th during the drive-about, Mr. Smith stopped at that Jack-in-theBox location and entered the store. And that would have been during the time
frame that some of these communications were occurring.
Additionally, the question is would Mr. Apker have recognized the defendant had
he actually came into the store. And so based on that, I do fmd that the prior
introduction of Mr. Smith to Mr. Apker is relevant for purposes of identity.
Because otherwise, how would he have known if he had been in the store or not if
he had not ever met him?
So the issue about the prior incident and the relay of harassment, there is
sufficient basis in the evidence for the Court to determine that the prior incident
actually did happen based on the testimony at trial so far.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.434, L.2 - p.435, L.17.)

1.

Mr. Apker's Testimony Pertaining To Prior Harassing Conduct Was Irrelevant

Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defmes relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. Even though
evidence might not be material to a disputed issue, such evidence may still be relevant if it is
probative and material. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, _ , 462 P.3d 1125, 1135 (2020).
Mr. Apker's testimony was not probative or material where Mr. Smith's identity was not
at issue-particularly where Mr. Apker testified that he was not in the store when Mr. Smith
came in on January 27, 2018. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.430, Ls.12-14.) Because Mr. Apker was not
present when Mr. Smith went to Ms. Cole's place of work on the night of the 27th (Trial Tr. Vol.
I, p.430, Ls.12-14), there was no reason for the prosecutor to ask Mr. Apker whether he could
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identify Mr. Smith or to ask him to recount Mr. Smith's first visit to the workplace and the
alleged prior misconduct. Accordingly, the evidence was not probative or material to any issue.

2.

Mr. Apker's Testimony Was More Prejudicial Than Probative

Even assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect outweighs
any limited probative value. The court concluded:
And so it would be permissible under 404(b) if it's not unduly prejudicial. And
this, what is the statements on the records related to that prior incident, quite
frankly, any undue prejudice can be resolved with a limiting instruction.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 436, Ls.8-12.) Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 states that "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice ... " I.R.E. 403. On one hand, the trial judge must gauge the probative worth of
the proffered evidence by focusing upon the degrees of relevance and materiality of the
evidence, and the need for the issue on which it is to be introduced. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114
Idaho 107 (1987). At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the
evidence amounts to unfair prejudice. Id.
Had the district court appropriately balanced the probative value of the evidence and the
danger of unfair prejudice, it would have found that any limited value was substantially
outweighed by the unfair prejudice created by presenting information amounting to an appeal to
the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury. Allowing the State to present evidence that
Mr. Smith exhibited harassing behavior at Ms. Cole's place of employment was unfairly
prejudicial. It allowed the State to portray Mr. Smith as a person who created problems for
Ms. Cole and her co-workers/place of employment. As such, the admission of this irrelevant
evidence tended to work great prejudice on Mr. Smith's case, as this evidence necessarily would

tend to imply that he had tendency to engage in jealous or harassing behavior like the criminal
offenses charged in this case.
The district court concluded that the testimony was not so prejudicial that it could not be
cured by a limiting instruction. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.439, L.24 - p.440, L.9.) When the jury
returned, the district court told them the following:
Now, for the jury, evidence was just introduced through Mr. Apker for the
purpose of showing that Mr. Apker knew the defendant's identity from a meeting
prior to January 27th of 2018.
Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to prove the defendant's
character or that the defendant had a disposition to commit crimes or bad acts.
Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of proving
the defendant's identity prior to January the 27th of 2018.
The Court specifically instructs you that you are not to consider Mr. Apker's
testimony about the frequency or purposes of telephone calls to the store prior to
January 27th of 2018. You can only consider Mr. Apker's testimony for the
purpose of the defendant's identity.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.441, L.15 - p.442, L.6; Aug., p.15.)

In this case, however, a limiting

instruction was insufficient to cure the harm. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "a limiting
instruction alone cannot always prevent an error from prejudicing the defendant."

State v.

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 670 (2010); State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229-31 (2008) (finding a
404(b) error not to be harmless despite a limiting instruction).
The irrelevant and overly prejudicial evidence served only to distract the jury from the
ultimate question of guilt or innocence and the State will be unable to prove the admission of the
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222
(2010) ("A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have
the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.")
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II.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smith's Motion For A Mistrial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Smith asserts that district court committed reversible error when it denied his motion

for a mistrial after the district court admitted irrelevant and overly prejudicial testimony
regarding Mr. Smith's prior harassing conduct in calling Ms. Cole's place of employment and
later coming into the store to apologize to Ms. Cole's supervisor for his harassing behavior.

B.

Standard Of Review
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 29.l(a), "[a] mistrial may be declared," inter alia, ''upon

motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the
proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant. ..
." I.C.R. 29.l(a). "The decision whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of
the district court . . . On appellate review [the] inquiry is whether the event which brought about
the motion for a mistrial constitutes reversible error when viewed in the context of the entire
record."

State v. Wachholtz, 131 Idaho 74, 77 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted).

In

considering whether the denial of a motion for mistrial resulted in reversible error, an appellate
court may consider the strength of the State's case. See State v. Keyes, 150 Idaho 543, 546
(Ct. App. 2011) (finding no error in the denial of a motion for mistrial "[i]n light of the
overwhelming evidence" presented by the State).
The following standards are utilized when the denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed
on appeal:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
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Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse
of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is
one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.

State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983). "Error is not reversible if this Court can
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same if the error had
not occurred." State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 2010).

C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smith's Motion For A Mistrial Where The
Prosecutor Elicited Irrelevant And Prejudicial Testimony Which Continuously Affected
The Trial
When viewed in the context of the full record, the district court's refusal to declare a

mistrial after the district court admitted irrelevant and overly prejudicial information regarding
the prior harassing behavior of Mr. Smith, as discussed in Section I, constituted reversible error.
The admission of this evidence tended to work great, and ongoing, prejudice on
Mr. Smith's case, as this evidence necessarily would tend to imply that he had tendency to
engage in jealous or harassing behavior. It allowed the State to portray Mr. Smith as an angry
person who created problems for Ms. Cole which was unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Smith's
defense.
Information that there had been prior incidences of harassing behavior perpetrated by
Mr. Smith against Ms. Cole was before the jury and the information continuously impacted the
trial. The prosecutor's conduct in asking the questions regarding Mr. Smith prior conduct was
extremely prejudicial. Later in the trial, the prosecutor again elicited irrelevant evidence over the
objections of the defense. See Section V. The prosecutor's questions regarding prior harassing
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conduct continuously impacted the trial to Mr. Smith's detriment. The district court's refusal to
declare a mistrial constituted reversible error. See State v. Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 421, 414
P.3d 234, 243 (2018).

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State's Fact Witness To Proffer
Opinion Testimony On The Effect OfBruising On Darker Skin Where The State Did Not
Disclose The Witness As An Expert Witness As Required By I.C.R. 16

A.

Introduction
During the second trial, the district court admitted testimony regarding a treatment

provider's medical opinion on how a bruise appears on someone with a darker skin tone, such as
an African-American, despite the fact that the prosecutor did not disclose this witness as an
expert witness pursuant to I.C.R. 16. By admitting the testimony, the district court abused its
discretion by failing to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it, and by failing to reach its decision by the exercise of reason.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial and its judgment

will be reversed only where there is an abuse of that discretion." State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,
250 (2008) (citations omitted). The trial court also has discretion to determine the appropriate
sanction for a discovery violation. State v. Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 588 (Ct. App. 2015). When
this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, it must consider "[w ]hether the
trial court:

(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer

boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the

14

specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason."
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (citation omitted).

Once a defendant appealing from an objected-to error has shown that the error occurred,
"the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). "To meet that burden, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013).
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to
say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial later held to have
been erroneous .... To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather,
to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on
the issue in question, as revealed in the record.
Id. (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds by
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991)). "Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 'is not

whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error."' Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)) (emphasis in original).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Allowed A Fact Witness To Testify Regarding General
Observations Of Bruising On African-American Skin, Absent The Witness's Disclosure
As An Expert
The State recalled Nurse Anne Wardle to continue her direct examination from the prior

day of trial. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.56, Ls.14-25.) The prosecutor elicited opinion testimony from
Nurse Wardle pertaining to a white mark photographed on Ms. Cole's neck. (Trial Tr. Vol. III,
p.61, L.20 - p.62, L.5.) Nurse Wardle testified that she was not sure if that was the normal
coloration of her neck. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.62, Ls.6-11.) The prosecutor then showed Nurse
Wardle a more recent picture of Ms. Cole's neck and asked her to opine on whether the more
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recent image changed Nurse Wardle's medical opinion on identification of the darkness on the
neck in State's Exhibit 21. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.62, Ls.12-22.) Defense counsel objected as the
question called for a medical opinion, which had not been disclosed to the defense.

(Trial

Tr. Vol. III, p.62, L.23 - p.63, L.14.) The district court found there was no danger of unfair
prejudice to the defense and overruled the objection. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.63, L.24 - p.64, L.1.)
The witness then testified that it could possibly be bruising that had resolved. (Trial Tr. Vol. III,
p.64, Ls.9-11.)
On re-direct, Nurse Wardle testified that she had general experience treating AfricanAmerican patient with a darker skin tone. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.75, Ls.7-9.) When she was asked
"And how does a bruise appear on someone with that skin tone?" defense counsel objected on
the basis that they were not given notice of this line of prospective testimony. (Trial Tr. Vol. III,
p.75, Ls.14-17.) The prosecutor argued that the defense had opened the door during their crossexamination by asking the witness whether she documented potential bruising to Ms. Cole's
neck during her examination. 2 (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.75, Ls.18-22.)
Defense counsel asserted that this was not testimony as a treatment provider, but as an
expert witness "offering general medical testimony or medical opinions," and thus the witness is
into the realm of an expert and that must be disclosed pursuant to I.C.R. 16. (Trial Tr. Vol. III,
p.75, L.25 - p.76, L.16.) The district court overruled the objection, finding that there was no
potential for unfair surprise. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.75, L.23 - p.76, L.17.) Thereafter, the nurse
testified that, in her experience treating African-American patients with a darker skin tone, such

2

When defense counsel asked the witness during cross-examination why she did not document
the little black marks on Ms. Cole's neck that the prosecution asked her about, the witness said,
"I wasn't sure if it was a skin discoloration or it was actual injury." (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.70,
Ls.1-9; State's Exhibit 21.) The witness also testified that she did not note any bruising on
Ms. Cole's neck. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.72, Ls.22-24.)
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as Ms. Cole's, bruising is not as evident as it is on paler skin. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.76, L.21 p.77, L.2.)
The admission of expert testimony is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, which
provides that testimony of qualified expert witnesses may be admitted if "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue .... " The admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary with the
trial court and a decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v.
Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 245 (2008); State v. Wright, 147 Idaho 150, 155 (Ct. App. 2009); State v.
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,647 (1998).

Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) provides that:
Upon written request of the defendant the prosecutor shall provide a written
summary or report of any testimony that the state intends to introduce pursuant to
Rules 702, 703 or 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence at trial or hearing. The
summary provided must describe the witness's opinions, the facts and data for
those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.
I.C.R. 16(b)(7).
In response to Mr. Smith's I.C.R. 16(b)(7) discovery request, the prosecution only
disclosed Drs. Binnion and King as expert witnesses who would proffer opinion testimony.
(State's Exhibit 50.) The district court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce
expert testimony absent notice of the substance of such testimony.

The appearance of

Ms. Cole's neck apparently was an issue for the jury during the first trial, where the jury could
not reach a unanimous decision on the attempted strangulation charge. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.962,
Ls.2-4; R., p.187.) As the prosecutor explained to the district court prior to the attempted
strangulation trial:
[A] fter the jury hung when I was getting feedback from jurors, one of -- they were
all white, I think. Suffice it to say none of the jurors were African-American, and
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she indicated that one of the issues were, or a few of the, I guess, hang ups,
holdouts, was that they were not familiar with how African-American skin may
look when it's injured, or in a state of healing, you know, scarred that, and so for
that reason, I'd ask the court if she could -- let me back up.
(Tr. 3/1/19, p.29, Ls.15-25.)
In an attempt to address the jury's feedback from the first trial, the prosecutor focused its
case-in-chief in the second trial on eliciting and introducing evidence relating to whether darker
skin such as Ms. Cole's did not show bruising in order to prove an attempted strangulation
occurred. (Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.28, L.11 - p.77 L.12.) The testimony by the State's undisclosed
expert witness who told the jury that dark skin such as Ms. Cole's did not show bruising, thereby
surprised and harmed Mr. Smith's defense that a strangulation did not occur because there was
no bruising on Ms. Coles' neck. (See Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.72, Ls.22-24.)
The district court abused its discretion when it acted inconsistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it by repeatedly allowing a treatment
provider to offer expert testimony absent compliance with I.C.R. 16 disclosure requirements.
The State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in
admitting the evidence is harmless.

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Allowing The State To Reopen Its Case-In-Chief

A.

Introduction
However, the prosecutor's feigned surprise that she would be required to prove some sort

of intimate relationship is contradicted by the plain language both of the statutes with which she
charged Mr. Smith with violating and by the language of the pattern jury instructions.
LC.§§ 18-903(a), -918(2), -923; ICJI 1213, 1277.
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See

Following a discussion of the district court's and the parties' proposed jury instructions,
the State sought to re-open its case-in-chief so that it could recall Ms. Cole and Detective
Wigington. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.823, L.8 - p.827, L.11.) The prosecutor sought to reopen its
case-in-chief because it claimed it did not have notice that the defense would be requesting a
specific definition for one of the terms utilized in the jury instructions for both domestic battery
and attempted strangulation-the meaning of "cohabitating." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.823, Ls.8-23.)
The district court granted the motion, over defense counsel's objection. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.824,
L.16 - p.825, L.20.) The district court abused its discretion in allowing the state to re-open its
case where cohabitation is part of the pattern jury instructions for both domestic battery and
attempted strangulation. See ICJI 1277, 1214. Thus, the State was on notice that it would have
to prove that Mr. Smith and Ms. Cole were cohabitating, and had been on notice since the day it
charged Mr. Smith with these crimes. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.823, L.8 - p.827, L.11; R., pp.33-34.)
It was therefore no surprise to the prosecutor that she would have to prove that Mr. Smith and
Ms. Cole were in an intimate relationship at the time of the incident, and were not simply living
as platonic roommates.

B.

Standard Of Review
A district court has the power to reopen a case prior to fmal judgment. Idaho Power

Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 743-44 (2000). This action may be taken by the court
pursuant to the motion of a party or on the court's own motion. Id. 134 Idaho at 744. When a
party seeks to reopen, it "must show some reasonable excuse, such as oversight, inability to
produce the evidence, or ignorance of the evidence." Id. (holding district court did not abuse its
discretion by granting Idaho Power's motion to reopen its case, given the confusion surrounding
what evidence was already on the record after summary judgment proceedings, judicial

19

admission, and an appeal to the Supreme Court). The decision will be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Id.
When the court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, it must consider
"[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason."
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Allowing The State To Reopen Its Case In
Chief Where The State Failed To Show A "Reasonable Excuse"
Mr. Smith asserts that the district court abused its discretion by allowing State to reopen

its case. The prosecutor sought to reopen the State's case after hearing the defense's proposed
jury instruction further defining the meaning ofcohabitating. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.823, Ls.17-22.)
The prosecutor agreed that the proposed jury instruction was a correct statement of the law.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.823, Ls.8-9.)
The Idaho Pattern Jury Instruction for domestic battery provides:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Domestic Battery, the state must prove
each of the following:
1. On or about [date]
2. in the state ofldaho
3. the defendant [name] committed a battery upon [name of victim][by
(description of conduct)]
4. while they were household members [,and
5. in doing so the defendant inflicted a traumatic injury upon (name of
victim)].
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must fmd
the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must fmd the defendant guilty.

20

Persons are "household members" if they [are married to each other] [were ever
married to each other] [have a child in common, regardless of whether they have
been married] [are cohabitating, regardless of whether they have married or hold
themselves out to be husband and wife].
["Traumatic injury" means a condition of the body, such as a wound or external
or internal injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by physical force.]
ICJI 1277. The Idaho Pattern Jury Instruction for attempted strangulation provides:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Attempted Strangulation, the state must
prove each of the following:
1. On or about [date]
2. in the state ofldaho
3. the defendant [name] [choked] [or] [attempted to strangle],
4. [name of victim]
5. willfully and unlawfully, and
6. [name of victim] was [a household member at the time of the offense]
[or] [a person with whom [name of defendant] had a dating relationship,
either at the time of the offense or at a previous time].
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find
the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
[Persons are "household members" if they [are married to each other] [were
previously married to each other] [have a child in common, regardless of whether
they have been married] [are cohabitating, regardless of whether they have
married or hold themselves out as husband and wife].]
["Dating relationship" is a social relationship of a romantic nature. Factors that
you may consider in making this determination include: (1) the nature of the
relationship; (2) the length of time the relationship has existed; and (3) the
frequency of interaction between the persons.]
The state is not required to show that the defendant intended to kill or injure the
victim. The only intent required is the intent to choke or attempt to strangle.
ICJI 1214.
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Ms. Cole told some of the medical care providers who treated her on January 28, 2018,
that she was beat up by her ex-boyfriend. 3 (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.394, Ls.19-24.) Mr. Smith
testified that his and Ms. Cole's relationship was not an intimate relationship. (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.697, L.20 - p.699, L.7; p.815, Ls.18-25.) The instruction proposed by the defense was a
definition of"cohabitating" based on the holding of State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863 (2011):
The term cohabitating denotes an intimate relationship. If the State has not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Michanglo Smith and Seanette Cole were
in an intimate relationship on or about January 27th and 28th, 2018, you must find
the defendant not guilty.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.813, Ls.2-12.)
However, the elements of the crimes the prosecutor was seeking to prove remained the
same, despite the change to the jury instructions. The State had charged Mr. Smith with felony
domestic battery by traumatic injury, and with attempted strangulation. (R., pp.33-34.) The jury
was instructed as to the definition of "household members" as follows:
Persons are "household members" if they are married to each other, were ever
married to each other, have a child in common, regardless of whether they have
been married, are cohabitating, regardless of whether they have married or hold
themselves out to be husband and wife.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.849, Lsl 1-17; Aug., pp.21, 23.)
The jury was also instructed as to the meaning of "cohabitating" within the definition of
"household member" as follows:
The term "cohabitating" in the definition of "household member" is a longrecognized term of art plainly denoting an intimate relationship. The phrase "are
cohabitating, regardless of whether they have been married or hold themselves out
to be husband and wife" includes intimate relationships such as boyfriendgirlfriend relationships.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.849, Ls.18-24; Aug., pp.21, 23.)
3

One medical care provider testified that Ms. Cole said she was punched, kicked, and strangled
by her boyfriend. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.504, Ls.14-20.)
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The domestic battery statute makes unlawful "any" "[w ]illful and unlawful use of force
or violence upon the person of another" and defines a "household member" as "a person who is a
spouse, former spouse, or a person who has a child in common regardless of whether they have
been married or a person with whom a person is cohabitating .... " LC. §§ 18-903(a) and 918(2). The attempted strangulation statute provides, "Any person who willfully and unlawfully
chokes or attempts to strangle a household member, or a person with whom he or she has or had
a dating relationship, is guilty of a felony." I.C. § 18-923(1). The jury instructions for both
attempted strangulation and domestic battery denote a relationship beyond child-parent or
roommates. See Schulz, 151 Idaho at 867-68 (holding "because the term "cohabiting" in the
definition of "household member" plainly does not apply in the absence of an intimate
relationship, we find it does not extend to a child victim ofher father's violence.")
The district court gave the Idaho Pattern Jury Instructions for the offenses charged by the
prosecution and included a definition commonly used and understood.

Thus, the prosecutor

could not have been surprised to learn that she would be required to prove Mr. Smith and
Ms. Cole were cohabitating, as this was part of the statutory language as well as the standard
pattern jury instructions.
Further, the district court's error harmed Mr. Smith's ability to present a defense. By
permitting the case to be reopened after Mr. Smith had testified that he and Ms. Coles were no
longer in a dating relationship, the district court eviscerated Mr. Smith's planned defense. The
State called Ms. Cole and asked her to confirm that she and Mr. Smith had sexual relations
during the month of January and that they had not broken up prior to the January 27-28 incident.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.833, Ls.15-25.) The district court abused its discretion by failing to act
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consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it and by
failing to reach its decision by the exercise of reason.

V.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Irrelevant Evidence Of An Incident Whereby A
Stranger Sexually Propositioned Mr. Smith

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it admitted testimony from a State's witness regarding a

female stranger in a bar asking Mr. Smith if he and Ms. Coles would be interested in a sexual
relationship. Contrary to the district court's ruling, whether or not Mr. Smith was propositioned
about a three-way is not "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action" more or less probable. I.R.E. 401.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency

to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence
is generally admissible; conversely, irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. I.R.E. 402. Whether
evidence is relevant is a question oflaw that is freely reviewed. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,
228 (2008).
The relevance of evidence is a question of law and therefore the appellate court reviews
the district court's determination that evidence is relevant de nova. State v. Raudebaugh, 124
Idaho 758, 764 (1993). The appellate court exercises free review over a trial court's relevance
determination because relevancy is neither a factual issue nor a matter of judicial discretion. See
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id.; State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999). Even though evidence might not be material to a

disputed issues, such evidence may still be relevant if it is probative and material. State v.
Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, _ , 462 P.3d 1125, 1135 (2020).

C.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Irrelevant Evidence That A Stranger Sexually
Propositioned Mr. Smith
Once the prosecutor reopened her case-in-chief during the domestic violence trial, she

called Detective Wigington.

Detective Wigington testified regarding his knowledge of the

nature of Mr. Smith and Ms. Cole's relationship and whether they were co-habitating or in a
domestic/dating relationship. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.836, L.1 -p.842, L.6.)
Detective Wigington was asked to explain an incident described by Mr. Smith wherein a
stranger propositioned Mr. Smith-where "sex was solicited for him." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.838,
Ls.14-17.) Defense counsel objected on relevance grounds (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.838, L.18), but the
district court overruled the objection without explanation (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.838, L.19), and the
witness testified:
A. At one time during the interview, he commented about being, I believe, at the
Varsity Pub, was approached by another female to have a three-way.

Q. Did he describe if Seanette was with him at that time?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. And did he describe what his response was at the request to have a three-way
with he and Seanette?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, relevance.
[THE COURT]: Overruled.
[THE WITNESS]: I think he indicated that it wasn't his style or wasn't his thing.
I'm not sure of his exact words.
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(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.838, L.21 - p.839, L.8.) In overruling Mr. Smith's objections, the district
court did not explain its reasoning, yet gave a limiting instruction on prior bad acts at the
conclusion of the detective's testimony. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.838, L.19; p.839, L.5; p.839, L.18 p.840, L.2.) Mr. Smith asserts that the discussion of the three-way was not relevant where it did
not make any material fact "more or less probable." I.R.E. 401.

Testimony recounting an

incident where a female stranger in a bar asked Mr. Smith ifhe and Ms. Cole would be interested
in a three-way sexual escapade did not give any insight into whether Mr. Jones battered or
choked a domestic partner-the only purpose in having the evidence admitted would be to
demonstrate that Mr. Smith was sexually attractive to a female stranger in a bar. The fact that a
stranger in a bar asked Mr. Smith ifhe would be interested in participating in sexual activity with
her and Ms. Cole does not establish a dating or sexual relationship between Ms. Cole and
Mr. Smith and serves only to besmirch Mr. Smith's character.
As such, Mr. Smith asserts that the challenged portion of Detective Wigington's
testimony are irrelevant as they do not have the "tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence."

D.

The Admission Of The Contested Testimony Of Detective Wigington Was Not Harmless
Error
The admission of Detective Wigington's testimony was not harmless error. The harmless

error doctrine has been defined by this Court: "To hold an error as harmless, an appellate court
must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that
such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507
(1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Where alleged error is raised,
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allowing the district court to rule upon the issue, and the appellant shows that a violation
occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). In this case, the State will be unable to prove that the
admission of the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

VI.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Smith To Pay $363 In
Restitution For Ms. Cole's Lost Wages

A.

Introduction
Mr. Smith challenges the district court's restitution order which required him to pay $363

for Ms. Cole's lost wages from January 28, 2018 through February 4, 2018. At the restitution
hearing, Ms. Cole sought restitution for the dates she was unable to work due to her injuries. She
testified that she was unable to work from January 28, 2018 through February 4, 2018.
(Tr. 6/14/19, p.221, Ls.17-22.)

A representative of the Crime Victims Compensation Fund

testified that she had received paperwork from Ms. Cole's employer, which stated that Ms. Cole
worked an average of 33 hours per week at the rate of $11 per hour; however, Ms. Cole's actual
schedule was not available and was not submitted to the district court. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.221,
Ls.17-22.) Mr. Smith asserts that the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution
for $363 in lost wages where the State failed to provide substantial and competent evidence that
Ms. Cole would have actually worked 33 hours from January 28 through February 4, 2018.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"'The decision regarding whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the

district court's discretion,' guided by factors in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7)." State v. Hurles,
158 Idaho 569, 573 (2015) (quoting State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011)). Appellate
courts use a four-part test for determining whether a district court abused its discretion: Whether
the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Ordered Mr. Smith To Pay $363 In Restitution For
Ms. Cole's Lost Wages
"It is generally recognized ... that courts of criminal jurisdiction have no power or

authority to direct reparations or restitution to a crime victim in the absence of a statutory
provision to such effect." State v. Gonzales, 144 Idaho 775, 777 (Ct. App. 2007). A district
court's exercise of discretion in ordering restitution is guided by the limitations set forth in
I.C. § 19-5304(7). State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011). On appeal, the factual findings
of the district court will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013).

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. The legislature has established that
economic losses are to be determined by a civil preponderance of the evidence standard.
LC.§ 19-5304(6); State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 38 (Ct. App. 2002).
Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) provides:
Restitution orders shall be entered by the court at the time of sentencing or such
later date as deemed necessary by the court. Economic loss shall be based upon
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the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by the prosecutor,
defendant, victim or presentence investigator. Each party shall have the right to
present such evidence as may be relevant to the issue of restitution, and the court
may consider such hearsay as may be contained in the presentence report, victim
impact statement or otherwise provided to the court.
I.C. § 19-5304(6).
When considering the general restitution statute, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
explained that "the amount of the award must be supported by substantial evidence" and is to be
determined "based upon the civil preponderance of the evidence standard." In re Doe, 146 Idaho
277, 284 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). LC. § 19-5304(2) states that "[r]estitution shall be
ordered for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers." "Webster's Dictionary defines
the word 'actually"' as something 'existing in fact or reality' and in contrast with the words
'potential and possible."'

State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 889 (2013) (holding evidence

regarding lost future wages is a speculative, rather than an actual economic loss).
During the restitution hearing, Mr. Smith stipulated to pay $4,229.21 in restitution to the
Crime Victims Compensation Fund. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.208, Ls.20-22.) Ms. Cole testified regarding
her lost wages. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.211, L.1 - p.226, L.17.) She testified that she was unable to work
from January 28, 2018 through February 4, 2018. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.221, Ls.17-22.) However, she
did not recall her hourly wage, and did not know what days she was scheduled to work between
those dates.

(Tr. 6/14/19, p.221, L.17 - p.222, L.12.)

Ms. Smith did not know who had

calculated her lost wages or the basis for the calculation. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.224, Ls.2-10.) Leah
Little testified on behalf of the Crime Victim's Compensation Fund. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.227, L.7 p.239, L.25.) Ms. Little testified that she had received paperwork from Ms. Cole's employer,
which stated that Ms. Cole worked an average of 33 hours per week at the rate of $11 per hour;
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however, Ms. Cole's actual schedule was not submitted to the district court. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.221,
Ls.17-22.)
The defense disputed $200 for Ms. Cole's lost wages, $607 for two visits by Ms. Cole to
Dr. King on January 29, 2019, $390.30 for the x-ray of Ms. Cole's hand taken at Saint
Alphonsus, and $256 requested for the January 31, 2019 visit to Dr. King. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.248,
Ls.5-10.) Mr. Smith asserted that the $200 in lost wages were speculative where Ms. Cole could
not identify her hourly wage at that job, and her weekly hours varied. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.248, L.14 p.249, L.17.) The defense objected to restitution for the two January 2019 visits to Dr. King as
not being for purposes of medical treatment, but for forensic work related to Mr. Smith's
prosecution. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.249, L.18 - p.250, L.20.) Lastly, Mr. Smith objected to the x-ray of
Ms. Cole's hand as not being related to Mr. Smith's convictions. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.250, L.21 p.251, L.15.)
The district court ruled as follows:
Therefore, based on the stipulation of the parties to the amount of $4,229 ,21 to the
Crime Victims Compensation Fund, this Court's finding that $863.61 were paid
for the two visits for medical treatment to Dr. King and paid by the Crime Victims
Compensation Fund, $200 were paid in lost wages to the victim by the Crime
Victims Compensation Fund.
So that would be a total of $5,292.82 that should be in the restitution order and
judgment payable to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. Then an additional
$390.30 for medical bills to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, and then
an additional $163 to Seanette Cole, to the victim directly, for lost wages.
So based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Court finds that Mr. Smith is
responsible for $5,846.12 in victim restitution.
(Tr. 6/14/19, p.260, L.21 - p.261, L.11.) The district court awarded the $200 to the Crime
Victims Compensation Fund for what it had paid to Ms. Cole for her lost wages, plus an
additional $163 in lost wages directly to Ms. Coles. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.257, L.4 - p.259, L.1.) The
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district court's calculations were based on Ms. Little's testimony of the employer's average of
Ms. Cole's weekly hours and rate of pay. (Tr. 6/14/19, p.257, L.25 -p.258, L.9.)
Under LC. § 19-5304(2), "[r]estitution shall be ordered for any economic loss which the
victim actually suffers." Restitution will not be awarded for speculative nor prospective losses.
See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 890 (2013) (holding lost wages were based on the possible

future wages and were thus inapposite to "actually suffered" economic loss compensable under
the statute).

The Straub Court addressed a claim for future lost wages-those beyond the

sentencing or restitution hearing-and analyzed the meaning of "actually suffered":
Webster's Dictionary defines the word "actually" as something "existing in fact
or reality" and in contrast with the words "potential and possible." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged Edition (1971).
Straub, 153 Idaho at 889.

Because the district court had heard no evidence that Ms. Cole was actually scheduled to
work the number of hours for which she was being compensated (Tr. 6/14/19, p.237, L.23 p.239, L.16), the $363 for lost wages awarded based on an average of past hours was purely
speculative and the district court erred by awarding $363 in restitution for the lost wages.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions on all counts and
his restitution order and remand this matter for a new trial.
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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